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Whether water systems should be owned and operated by governments or private firms is 
intensely controversial, and little empirical research sheds light on the issue.  In this paper we use 
a panel dataset that includes every community water system in the U.S. from 1997-2003 to test 
the effects of ownership and benchmark competition on regulatory compliance and household 
water expenditures.  We find that when controlling for water source, location fixed effects, 
county income, urbanization, and year, there is little difference between public and private 
systems.  Public systems are somewhat more likely to violate the maximum levels of health-
based contaminants allowed under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), while private systems 
are somewhat more likely to violate monitoring and reporting regulations.  The results are 
reversed for systems that serve more than 100,000 people.  Household expenditures on water at 
the county level decrease slightly as the share of private ownership increases, contradicting fears 
that private ownership brings higher prices.  While direct competition among piped water 
systems is practically nonexistent, we find that benchmark competition among water systems 
within counties is associated with fewer SDWA violations and, when combined with private 
ownership, lower household expenditures.  Overall, the results suggest that absent competition, 
whether water systems are owned by private firms or governments may, on average, simply not 
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  Since the early twentieth century most utilities in the United States, including electricity, 
gas, and telecommunications, have been provided by private, regulated firms.  For most of the 
century these firms held monopolies over some geographic area, reflecting the then-conventional 
wisdom that these industries were natural monopolies.  Over the last few decades competition 
has emerged, robustly in telecommunications and to a lesser extent in electricity and gas.  Water 
and sewerage services, however, largely buck these trends.  They remain monopolies nearly 
everywhere, and unlike other utilities in the U.S., tend to be owned by the state. 
More than 80 percent of the U.S. population receives piped water from a government- 
(typically municipally-) owned monopoly.
1  Private sector participation is more common in other 
countries, such as France, where 75 percent of the population receives water from a utility 
managed by a private company (Nadol, Seidenstat, and Hakim 2000).  Indeed, two of the largest 
private water companies in the world—Générale des Eaux and Lyonnaise des Eaux—are French 
(The Economist 2003b).  Privatization of water utilities is also increasingly common in 
developing countries. 
  Whether water systems should be owned by governments or by private firms is intensely 
controversial.  Proponents of private ownership argue that firms can deliver water and sewerage 
services more efficiently than can governments.  Governments have diverse, and often 
contradictory, objectives that can lead to a misallocation of resources.  Politicians may feel 
pressure to provide jobs in the utility to constituents, for example, rather than investing in the 
water network.  In addition, when government owns and operates utilities it may be both the 
regulator and the regulated firm, with potentially incompatible incentives. 
                                                 
1 According to the Environmental Protection Agency (2003), in 2003, about 82% of the population collectively 
served by all community water systems was known to be served by a local, state, or federal government-owned 




Opponents of private ownership counter that privatization is at best difficult and often 
impractical given the large externalities in delivering water and sewerage services and the 
limited scope for competition.  Many also worry that a private firm’s profit-maximization 
objective will make it less likely to serve the public interest than a state-owned provider, 
resulting in less healthy water and higher prices.  Others simply object to the very idea of 
considering water an economic good or allowing a private company to run a water system.  
Public Citizen (2004), an outspoken critic of privatization, highlights the intense feelings 
regarding private water services exclaiming that “perhaps the greatest theft of common resources 
facing humanity and the planet is the corporate takeover of the world’s water.” 
  There is little empirical evidence, however, on whether one form of ownership leads to 
better outcomes than another.  The answer to the controversy is crucial because it is an industry 
that affects literally everyone, and many believe that piped water systems around the world, 
including in the United States, are in dire need of investment.  The American Water Works 
Association estimated that U.S. water systems will require investment on the order of $250 
billion over the next 30 years (cited in Committee on Privatization of Water Services 2002).  
And the situation does not appear to be improving.  A U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(2002) survey found that about one-quarter of all water systems did not raise enough revenues 
through user charges to cover the full cost of providing service, and nearly 30 percent of all 
water systems had deferred investment because of lack of funds.  The GAO also noted that 
budgets may become further strained if water systems must increase security in response to 9/11.  
  Despite the passions the issue raises, to our knowledge there is no systematic empirical 
analysis comparing public and private water systems in the United States.  In addition, while 
direct competition among piped water systems is essentially nonexistent, the large number of 
water systems suggests that there could be benchmark, or yardstick, competition if consumers, 
regulators, or politicians can compare one water system to another.  We are not aware of any 
literature exploring the potential impact of benchmark competition in the water sector.  We 
address these gaps by exploring water quality and household expenditures on water by 
ownership type and degree of benchmark competition faced by water systems in the United 
States.  In particular, we use a panel dataset that includes every community water system in the 
country from 1997 – 2003 to test the effects of ownership and benchmark competition on 




data from the 2000 U.S. Census to test whether household expenditures on water services differ 
by ownership type and degree of competition. 
  Controlling for location fixed effects, system size, water source, and the year in which the 
violation occurred, we find little difference between public and private ownership on Safe 
Drinking Water Act violations.  Among smaller water systems private ownership is associated 
with fewer violations of regulated maximum contaminant levels but more violations of 
monitoring and reporting rules than public systems.  Among systems that serve more than 
100,000 people, private ownership is associated with more contaminant but fewer monitoring 
and reporting violations than public systems.  Greater benchmark competition, as measured by 
the concentration of the share of connections held by water systems in each county, is associated 
with fewer contaminant and monitoring and reporting violations. 
Average household expenditures on water at the county level, meanwhile, decrease 
slightly as the percentage of county water systems that is private increases.  These results suggest 
that households spend $14 a year less in counties in which water is provided only by private 
operators than in a county in which water is provided only by public operators.  Benchmark 
competition by itself appears to increase prices by a small amount (about six dollars a year from 
the least to the most competitive counties), except in the presence of private systems, where 
competition appears to reduce annual expenditures by up to about $33 in the most competitive 
counties with all private operators. 
The results provide no evidence supporting critics of private ownership, but also do not 
suggest that private ownership is inherently superior.  Privately-owned systems, on average, 
comply with drinking water regulations just as well as—and in some cases better than—publicly-
owned systems.  Consumers do not appear to pay more for water, on average, when served by 
private systems and may pay a bit less.  The evidence also suggests that benchmark competition 
in water provision improves regulatory compliance and, when combined with private ownership, 
reduces household expenditures on water.  Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that public or private ownership may not make much of a difference when the operator is largely 







2. The Economics of Water Systems 
 
Unique aspects of water and sewerage provision create challenges for private sector 
participation.  The potential for competition is limited, the sector has many externalities, and 
because water is essential for life and literally falls from the sky governments often encounter 
political and legal obstacles to privatization.
2  At the same time, other features of the industry 
create inherent disincentives for investment in water provision by both firms and governments.  
In particular, the long-lived fixed assets create incentives to delay investment, use revenues for 
other purposes, and for governments to expropriate a private firm’s assets. 
In principle, direct competition is possible in some areas of piped water, such as water 
supply in a multi-reservoir system (Noll 2002b).  In practice, however, competition has been 
limited.  The lack of competition reflects two features of water and sewage networks.  First, 
transporting water or sewage over long distances is costly and difficult.
3  Second, a large share of 
the cost of supplying water and collecting sewage is tied up in the distribution network, where 
the potential for direct competition is limited.
4  Indirect competition is more feasible.  Such 
competition could take the form of private firms competing for operation and management 
contracts (competition for the market) or benchmark competition, where the large number of 
water systems means that consumers and regulators may sometimes be able to compare their 
water system to others. 
A second reason why privatization is difficult is that externalities are more pronounced in 
water and sewerage than in other utilities.  Health-related externalities are probably the most 
                                                 
2 As an example of this, Zérah et al. (2001) note that the Argentine government chose a concession contract in 
Buenos Aires over full privatization because selling sector assets would have posed legal problems. 
3  Water transport does occur, especially to regions with insufficient water from more water-rich areas.  Southern 
California, for example, imports water from watersheds in northern California through many miles of pipelines and 
aqueducts.  State, federal, and local government facilities transport and deliver the imported water. See 
http://www.calwaterassn.com/ConservationSupply.htm (Last accessed: 2/18/05). 
4 Approximately two-thirds of the cost of water supply is related to the cost of the supply network for water.  In 





serious, as water contamination can cause widespread disease and other health problems.
5  
Extracting water from its source can cause other externalities.  When water is taken from an 
aquifer faster than it is replenished, the quality of the remaining water decreases—for example, 
the remaining water becomes increasingly difficult to extract and can become salinated, and 
large sinkholes can develop.  Other features of the water system may display some public good 
aspects.  Water pressure, for example, typically must remain high enough at all times to fight 
fires.  These issues all suggest that water services may be subject to a variety of market failures 
that require some type of government involvement or regulation. 
Externalities do not necessarily imply a need for government ownership, per se, only for 
a mechanism to ensure that pricing, investment, and other operational decisions take those 
externalities into account.  Indeed, absent some oversight mechanism governments may be 
equally likely to disregard externalities, especially where their effects are not easily observed. 
Other features of the water and sewerage infrastructure create incentives for governments 
and firms to delay investment.  A large portion of sector assets, such as the pipes, are literally 
sunk, have no alternative uses, and are extremely long-lived.  Because the fixed costs make up 
such a large share of total costs and because the system can operate for a long period of time 
without much intervention, a self-financing utility will earn quasi-rents (Noll 2002a).   The 
existence of these quasi-rents creates pressures to use them for short-term priorities rather than 
investment in the water system.  Consumers may demand lower tariffs, a call politicians are 
likely to answer.  Governments that own and operate their water systems may face pressure to 
use revenues for other immediate needs.  The long-lived fixed assets mean that private operators, 
meanwhile, are especially prone to expropriation by the government and may therefore face 
investor pressure to avoid reinvesting the quasi-rents.
6 
                                                 
5 The extent to which health is actually an externality depends on whether consumers and the utility bear the full 
costs of any health impacts.  In developing countries, where leaking water systems create standing pools of water 
that serve as breeding grounds for disease-carrying mosquitoes and where sewage runoff spreads bacteria, health 
presents an enormous externality in water systems.  In industrialized countries these particular problems are less 
severe.  Nonetheless, absent some type of oversight consumers have little means of monitoring the health quality of 
their water. 
6 Water systems in the United States in the 19
th century were largely privately run, though cities began to 
municipalize them in the early 20
th century.  Troesken and Geddes (2001) argue that the wave of municipalization 
occurred because the private firms were under-investing in their networks, but that this underinvestment occurred 
because the municipalities could not credibly commit to not expropriating their resources.  In other words, they 




It is possible to avoid proper maintenance of a piped water system for a long time.  Many 
water systems in the U.S., of course, have already been operating for a long time.  A Government 
Accountability Office (2002) survey found that in about one-third of water systems surveyed, 20 
percent or more of their pipelines nearing the end of their useful life.  By one estimate, about 
$250 billion is required over the next 30 years to rehabilitate and expand aging water systems.
7  
The costs involved in running water systems, moreover, are increasing.  Complying with the 
Safe Drinking Water Act is costly as is addressing post-9/11 security concerns (Committee on 
Privatization of Water Services 2002; Seidenstat 2003).   Private sector participation could play 
an important role in running and improving these systems. 
 
The evidence on private sector participation 
A number of papers have explored the impacts of privatization in a variety of industries.  
Megginson and Netter (2001) and Shirley and Walsh (2000) find in comprehensive reviews of 
the literature that privatization across the world generally improved efficiency.  Little of that 
empirical research, however, focuses on water.  Because privatization has been combined with 
competition in sectors like telecommunications, it is less clear whether government or private 
ownership is inherently superior in the water sector, where the potential for competition is 
limited.
8  Without appropriate incentives—in the form of regulation, some type of oversight, or a 
viable threat of entry in some sphere of operations—a private monopoly may not be an 
improvement over a public monopoly. 
The research that does exist on water privatization consists primarily of case studies, 
which are useful and interesting, but by their nature are difficult to generalize.  These studies are 
usually not chosen randomly, but rather tend to focus on exceptional cases.
9  For water services, 
those cases often focus on spectacular failures, such as the disastrous privatization attempt in 
                                                 
7 Estimate from the American Water Works Association, as cited by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences 
(2002).   The situation in much of the rest of the world is far worse.  Nearly 20 percent of the world’s population 
does not have access to improved water and more than one-third does not have access to improved sanitation 
(Kessides 2004).  The World Commission on Water estimated that mitigating water and sanitation problems would 
require US$600-800 billion between 2000 and 2010 (as cited in Bourbigot and Picaud 2001) 
8 See, for example, Noll (2000), Ros (1999), or Wallsten (2001) on telecommunications in developing countries. 
9 Shirley (2002) is an exception.  This collection of six water privatization case studies was undertaken with a 
coherent framework meant to ensure that the cases, in countries with varying institutional and physical 




Cochabamba, Bolivia.  A focus on failures is not surprising—they may involve large amounts of 
money and affect large populations.  Atlanta, for example, signed a 20-year, $428 million 
management contract with a private operator in 1998, only to cancel it a few years later as both 
the city and the firm accused the other of violating the contract (Brubaker 2003).  However, at 
least 25,000 U.S. water systems are privately owned and other countries like France rely heavily 
on the private sector without disastrous consequences, suggesting that such spectacular cases 
may not be representative.
10  As a former water analyst for Public Citizen noted, "Contrary to the 
critics' contentions, private operators have a respectable record of providing quality water and 
complying with environmental standards” (Tsybine 2002). 
Indeed, case studies of water ownership in industrialized countries together yield 
inconclusive results.  The Economist (2003a) argues that water privatization in the UK has been 
successful when compared to water systems in Scotland, which went from private to public 
hands.  Saal and Parker (2001), contrarily, find higher prices but little improvement in 
productivity following the 1989 UK privatization.  Likewise, Cowan, et al. (2000) estimate that 
privatization in the UK led to a net loss in total welfare, with consumers and the government net 
losers and the firm and its employees net gainers.   
The majority of the few empirical studies on water privatization suffer from a lack of 
good, consistent data, and their results are generally inconclusive.  One exception is a study by 
Galiani et al. (2003), who rigorously explore the effect of water privatization on child mortality 
using data from Argentina in the 1990s.  They find that child mortality fell eight percent in 
regions that privatized their water systems, and that the effects were largest in the poorest 
areas.
11  Clarke, et al. (2004) find in a household-level study of water ownership in developing 
countries that connection rates to piped water increased following privatization, even among the 
poor, but that connection rates increased similarly in areas that did not privatize. 
Empirical research on the effects of private sector participation in industrialized countries 
focuses largely on operating efficiency, and is inconclusive.  Several studies in the 1980s used 
                                                 
10 In 2003 there were 25,977 privately owned community water systems according to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (2003). 
11 Their analysis is rigorous: the authors hone their findings by separating mortality that can be caused by water 
conditions from mortality unrelated to water.  Privatization was uncorrelated with mortality from non-water causes, 
but strongly correlated with mortality caused by water conditions, ruling out spurious correlations.  Moreover, the 
measured effect may be underestimated since their water access data under-sampled the poorest areas, which 




fairly small datasets (120 observations and fewer) to compare the efficiency of public and private 
water systems in the U.S., and found no significant difference (Byrnes, Grosskopf, and Hayes 
1986; Feigenbaum and Teeples 1983; Teeples and Glyer 1987).  Bhattacharyya, et al. (1995), 
however, found in a sample of 190 public and 31 private water systems that when systems are 
small, private operators tend to be more efficient and when they are large, public operators tend 
to be more efficient.  Renzetti (2003), reviewing this literature, concluded that there was little 
evidence of “unambiguous improvements” from privatization, but that public-private 
partnerships might be promising. 
While existing empirical studies on the effects of ownership focus primarily on operating 
efficiency, at least two other issues are also important: water quality and prices.  In particular, 
critics of private ownership worry that private operators may give less weight to public interest 
than would a government operator, resulting in lower quality water and higher prices.  To our 
knowledge there are no large-scale empirical studies of the effects of ownership on water quality 
or prices in industrialized countries.  In a PowerPoint presentation, Gasteyer and Vaswani (2004) 
use a portion of the same EPA data that we use to investigate these questions, but only with 
cross-sectional data and county averages.
12  They conclude that private operators have slightly 
more contaminant violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act, but that household expenditures 
decrease as private ownership increases.  Finally, no research appears to have explored in any 
way the impacts of competition to the extent that it might exist. 
This paper aims to shed light on the effects of ownership and competition on water 
quality and prices in the U.S.  Our comprehensive water system level panel dataset, derived from 
data collected by the EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act and data collected by the US 
Census, allows us to address those issues. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Our analysis improves on theirs in a number of ways that allows us to explore the data in a far more rigorous way.  
First, we use a panel dataset covering 1997 – 2003, while they use only a cross-section from year 2000.  Second, our 
contaminant analysis is at the level of the water system, while they use county averages.  That is, for the 
contaminant analysis we use the ownership status of each water system rather than the share of water systems in a 
county that are public or private.  Third, we use an econometric approach suited to this type of data that allows us to 
control for many factors other than ownership that might affect quality.  Contrarily, Gasteyer and Vaswani show 
only a regression line highlighting the correlation between ownership share and average number of violations in the 
county.  Finally, in our exploration of ownership and expenditures on water, we also use county averages, but in an 




3. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 is the primary federal law regulating the 
quality of public drinking water. The Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to set standards for drinking water quality and to regulate the states, localities, and water 
suppliers that implement those standards.
13  The SDWA covers all public water systems in the 
United States—some 160,000 systems in total.  Under SDWA, the EPA sets maximum levels for 
naturally-occurring and manmade contaminants, outlines water treatment procedures, and 
requires water systems to follow a prescribed water quality monitoring schedule. 
Congress expanded the scope of the SDWA in its 1986 amendments to protect aquifers 
from pollutants and develop drinking water standards for previously unregulated contaminants.
14  
The 1986 amendments also banned plumbing materials containing lead and strengthened the 
EPA's ability to impose civil and criminal penalties on systems in violation.
15  In 1996 several 
additional amendments emphasized protecting source water, mandated operator training and 
certification, and officially required water systems to provide accurate and timely information on 
water quality to consumers.
16 
 The EPA and states share responsibility for implementing SDWA regulations. Usually 
the states are responsible for enforcement while the EPA provides oversight and technical 
assistance.  When a public water system violates a regulation (e.g., exceeds the maximum 
allowed level of a contaminant), the EPA notifies the system and the state.  The state is then 
required to take action within 30 days.  If the state fails to take the appropriate actions, the EPA 
intervenes.
17 
                                                 
13 See the EPA’s SDWA website for details: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/sdwa/index.html (last accessed 3/3/05). 
14 The 1986 revision added 83 additional contaminants to the list (Sapat and Teske 2004). 
15 See EPA (1986). “President Signs Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments” (June 1986), available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/sdwa/04.htm (last accessed 3/3/05). 
16 See EPA (2004). “Safe Drinking Water Act 30th Anniversary: Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act” (June 
2004), available at: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/sdwa/30th/factsheets/understand.html (last accessed 3/3/05). See 
also EPA (2005). “The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 Strengthening Protection for America's 
Drinking Water,” available at: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/sdwa/theme.html (last accessed 3/4/05). 




The EPA can pursue administrative actions on its own or involve the Department of 
Justice and pursue judicial action.  Under an administrative action, the EPA unilaterally orders a 
noncompliant water system to come into compliance within a specified time period.  If the 
system fails to do so, the EPA can assess a civil penalty of up to $25,000.  If a water system still 
fails to comply or does not pay the civil penalty, the EPA can pursue judicial action. Under a 
judicial action, a federal court will often issue an injunction requiring compliance within a 
specified time period, and assess penalties of up to $27,500 per day of continued violation.
18 
 
4. Data and Analysis 
 
  We directly benefit from the 1996 SDWA amendment by using the data generated by its 
reporting requirements.  We obtained data on each community water system in the United States 
from the Environmental Protection Agency’s Safe Drinking Water Information System, Federal 
Version (SDWIS/FED).
19  The SDWIS/FED contains data on every public water system in the 
United States, including tribal areas and U.S. territories.  Water systems are required to test their 
water for a variety of contaminants every month and report results to the state.
20  The state, in 
turn, determines whether water systems are in compliance with the regulations and report any 
violations to the EPA every quarter.
21   The EPA records this information in the SDWIS/FED, 
                                                 
18 Koorse (2001). 
19 We are grateful to Lee Kyle of the EPA Office of Water for extracting these data for us from the system and 
patiently answering our many questions and requests for additional data.  The authors, however, are solely 
responsible for any mistakes made in using or interpreting the data. 
A community water system is a public water system that serves at least 15 service connections used by year-round 
residents or regularly serves at least 25 year-round residents. Most residences including homes, apartments and 
condominiums in cities, small towns and mobile home parks are served by community water systems (EPA). 
20 The EPA’s Standardized Monitoring Framework describes how often systems have to monitor their water 
supplies for different chemicals based on the particular characteristics of that system. For instance, if a system has 
had no violations by a certain contaminant and is located in an area where the risk of a certain contaminant is low, 
the system can apply for an exemption from testing for that contaminant as frequently as would a system with a 
history of such violations. For more information, see: 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pws/pdfs/qrg_smonitoringframework.pdf (Last accessed: 12/14/04). 
21 According to 40 CFR part 142, section 15: "Each State which has primary enforcement responsibility shall submit 
quarterly reports to the Administrator on a schedule and in a format prescribed by the [EPA]Administrator, 
consisting of the following information: (1) New violations by public water systems in the State during the previous 
quarter of State regulations adopted to incorporate the requirements of national primary drinking water regulations, 
including violations of the public notification requirements... ." For more information, see 




which therefore contains data on violations of maximum allowed levels of certain contaminants 
as well as treatment and reporting violations.
22  Violations are reported as discrete events and 
released by the EPA annually, so the dataset reveals, for example, how frequently water supplied 
by each water system exceeded the maximum allowed levels of certain contaminants in a given 
year, but not by how much.  Appendix 1 contains the list of regulated contaminants. 
  The SDWIS/FED also includes self-reported information on ownership, number of 
service connections, population served, water source, and the geographic location of each water 
system.  Ownership categories include private, federal, state, municipal, tribal, public/private, 
and unknown.  The private sector can be involved in the water system in a large number of ways, 
from complete ownership and operation to small contract operations work.  We had hoped that 
the public/private category would capture these contract operations.  Unfortunately, according to 
the EPA, there is no written definition of “Public/Private” for the water systems to use when 
submitting their data and the category is not used in a consistent way.
23 
  The resulting dataset is quite large.  The panel covers 1997-2003 and includes 377,629 
active water system years.
24  While the precise number of water systems changes each year, for 
2003 the dataset contains 90,421 community water systems of which 53,245 are active.
25 Table 1 
shows the number of water systems by ownership status and size category, and Table 2 shows 
the total number of service connections by ownership and size. 
  The first fact that emerges from the tables is that there are far more private water systems 
than any other ownership type, but that those systems tend to be “very small” (25-500 
connections).  A casual inspection of the names of very small systems suggests that they are 
largely mobile home parks, apartment and condominium complexes, and resorts and hotels.   
Nonetheless, a substantial number of medium to very large systems are private, although the very 
                                                 
22 A treatment violation is a failure to properly treat a drinking water source in order to reduce the level of a 
specified contaminant. A reporting violation is a failure to collect the required number of samples (including 
confirmation samples) in the specified time frame, a failure to ensure the samples are analyzed properly, or a failure 
to submit all required monitoring information.  
23 Conversations with Lee Kyle, EPA Office of Water. 6/17/04 and 12/3/04. 
24  The violations data extend back to 1976, but a record of ownership begins only in 1997. 
25 Inactive water systems are those reported to the EPA as being inactive as well as those that reported in one year 




largest (those that serve over 1,000,000, not identified separately in this table) are owned only by 
local governments. 
  While private and municipal systems account for more than 90 percent of all community 
water systems, the tables also show that state and federal governments own a number of water 
systems.  State-owned community water systems appear to serve primarily prisons and 
universities.  Federally-owned systems serve military bases, national parks, and some prisons.  
Finally, Native American tribes often own and operate their own water systems. 
  As described above and in more detail in Appendix 1, the SDWIS/FED contains data on 
the number of different types of regulatory violations for each system per year, including 
violations of the maximum allowed level of a number of health-related contaminants, treatment 
violations, and monitoring and reporting violations.. 
Figure 1  shows the average number of contaminant violations from 1997-2003 by 
ownership type and system size.  The figure shows that U.S. drinking water systems, on average, 
only infrequently violate these regulations.  The average number of health-based contaminant 
violations is generally less than 0.1 per year—that is, less than one every ten years for the 
“average” system.  The figure also shows that the average masks variation across system types.  
Water systems owned by Native American tribes tend to experience the most frequent 
contaminant violations, followed by private systems and then municipal systems.  Federally-
owned systems report the fewest violations of the maximum allowed health-based contaminant 
levels.   
The number of contaminant violations by size gives a somewhat different view.  Smaller 
systems tend to have the largest number of violations of all types, though “large” water systems 
appear, on average, to have almost as many contaminant violations as very small systems.   
Differences across size mean that simple comparisons across ownership types may be deceptive 



















Average Annual Maximum Contaminant Level Violations
 
Figure 2 shows the average number of treatment technique violations from 1997-2003 by 
ownership type and system size.  The figure shows that the average number of treatment 
technique violations is generally less than the number of maximum contaminant level violations 
per year. Again, the figure shows variation across system types.  On average, water systems 
owned by Native American tribes experience the most frequent treatment technique violations, 
followed by locally-owned systems and then federal systems.  Private and state-owned systems 
report the fewest treatment technique violations. 
 
Figure 2 



















The figure also shows that the average number of treatment technique violations 
increases with system size.  At first glance this positive correlation between system size and 
treatment technique violations is puzzling given that small systems tend to have more 
contaminant violations than do larger systems and generally have fewer resources available to 
comply with regulations.  This result, however, does not arise from different regulatory 
compliance by size.  Instead, as Figure 3 shows, it arises because water systems of different sizes 
tend to use different types of water sources, and treatment technique violations vary by water 
source regardless of system size.  That the average number of treatment violations differs across 
sources may reflect differing inherent water quality and the fact that required treatments vary by 
water quality.  
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The figure shows average treatment technique violations by water source and system size 
as well as the percentage of systems in each size category that gets water from each source.  The 
top graph shows that the average number of treatment violations differs substantially by water 
source, but much less by system size within each water source.  Systems that use ground water 
have relatively few violations regardless of size.
26  Systems that rely primarily on surface water 
have a relatively large number of violations regardless of size, though small systems using 
ground water tend to have more violations than larger systems using ground water.  The bottom 
graph, meanwhile, shows that smaller systems are far more likely to use ground water and larger 
systems more likely to use surface water.  Thus, Figure 3 implies that the seemingly strange 
result in Figure 2 reflects differences in water source rather than different regulatory compliance 
by size. 
Figure 4 shows the average number of monitoring and reporting violations from 1997-
2003 by ownership type and system size. The figure shows that monitoring and reporting 
violations are more common than other violation types, with all but local systems receiving at 
least 1 monitoring violation per year, on average.  On average, water systems owned by Native 
American tribes experience the most frequent monitoring and reporting violations.  Locally-
owned systems have, on average, the fewest monitoring violations.  Very small systems tend to 
have higher numbers of monitoring and reporting violations than larger systems.  The average 
number decreases through medium systems and then increases for large and very large systems.  
Very large water systems appear to be the second-largest violator of monitoring and reporting 
regulations. 
                                                 
26 Sapat and Teske (2004) note that groundwater “was once perceived as a virtually unlimited natural resource that 
purified itself as it passed through sandy soil, [but] scientific studies have revealed large amounts of contamination 
in groundwater supplies.”  It is not clear from the figure whether surface water is inherently more contaminated or 
whether water systems that use ground water are simply required to undertake fewer treatment techniques, thus 



















Average Annual Monitoring and Reporting Violations
 
 
  These figures suggest that there may be differences across ownership and size categories, 
but by themselves cannot control for enough factors to interpret.  To explore the data more 
rigorously, we next explore the data econometrically. 
 
Econometric analysis 
  As discussed above, the data include the number of violations each year, but not the 
degree of violation.  In other words, the dependent variable—violations—consists of count data.  
In addition, the violations data contain a large number of zeroes and small values, suggesting that 
the dependent variable is drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter λit:












= = , 
where yit is the number of violations system i reports in year t,  
(2) ln  λit = β’xit, and xit is a vector of independent variables. 
It therefore follows that 
(3) E[yit|xit] = Var[yit|xit] = λit = e 
β’xit 
  The Poisson distribution, however, assumes that the mean of the variable equals its 
variance.  In our case, the variance of each dependent variable of interest far exceeds the mean, 
                                                 




suggesting overdispersion in the data and that a negative binomial distribution is more 
appropriate (Greene 1993; Long and Freese 2003).
28 
  The negative binomial regression is similar to the Poisson regression except that  
(4)  λit = exp(β’xit + εit) and E(εit) = 0. 
29 
  As noted above, yit is the number of violations in system i in year t.  In the econometric 
analysis we focus on contaminant level and monitoring and reporting violations as the number of 
treatment technique violations is too small to generate consistent results.  The vector xit includes 
system size and dummy variables indicating ownership type.  Because of the differences by 
system in size and ownership, we also interact the ownership variables with the five size 
category dummies discussed above.  Water quality and the economics of drinking water 
provision can be affected by the physical and topographical characteristics of the water system’s 
location (Noll 2002a).  To control for these factors, we control for location fixed effects—
dummy variables indicating in which “core based statistical area” (CBSA) the water system is 
located.  All the fixed effect dummies equal zero for water systems not located in any CBSA.
30  
We also include dummy variables indicating the water source (e.g., groundwater or surface 
water), as this may influence the inherent water quality as discussed above, and year fixed effects 
to account for changes in systems’ abilities to implement or follow regulations over time and 
other factors that may change contaminant levels over time (e.g., increased or decreased 
pollution from other sources into drinking water supplies).
31 
  We also include county-level variables that may affect outcomes.  In particular, we 
include average county household income and the share of the county’s population that lives in 
an urban area.  These variables come from the 2000 U.S. Census, which means that they 
                                                 
28 The means and variances (mean, variance) of the violations are: contaminant (0.10, 0.27), treatment (0.05, 0.23), 
monitoring (1.14, 54.69). 
29 See Long and Freese (2003) for an excellent description of the negative binomial regression model. 
30 In theory we would include county-level or even system-level fixed effects, which would be superior to our 
collection of metro area fixed effects.  Unfortunately, this proved impossible given the resources available to us for 
two reasons.  First, Allison and Waterman (2002) point out that the STATA procedure for estimating the fixed 
effects negative binomial regression does not actually control properly for the fixed effects.  Second, given that 
problem in STATA, we did not have enough computer resources to include all 3,141 county fixed effects in the 
equation, let alone 50,000+ water system dummies.  However, including fixed effects manually rather than by using 
STATA’s “xt” commands has the advantage of allowing us to use procedures developed by Long and Freese (2003) 
to simulate expected number of violations for each type of system based on the regression results. 
31  We drop systems whose ownership status is “unknown” and, unfortunately, systems whose status is 




unfortunately vary only over county, and not over time.  Income and urbanization do not change 
radically in a short period of time—and differences across counties probably change even less—
so these variables are reasonable proxies for income and urbanization even in years other than 
2000. 
    Finally, while no piped water systems directly compete with each other for given 
households (to our knowledge), the existence of such a large number of water systems may 
facilitate benchmark competition.  Benchmark competition could occur if consumers, regulators, 
or politicians can compare outcomes and prices from proximate water systems.  To capture this 
possibility, we create a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure concentration in the water 
system “industry.”  To calculate this variable, we define a county as a market and the share of the 
total connections in a county that a water system serves to be its market share. 
  Our measure of competition emphasizes the monopolistic nature of the industry.  A 
completely monopolistic market would yield an HHI of 10,000, and the US Justice Department 
deems an industry to be heavily concentrated if the HHI exceeds 1,800.  Because piped water 
systems do not compete within the same geographic space and customers do not have a choice of 
water provider short of moving to a new water district, a more typical calculation of the HHI 
would imply that the market is completely monopolistic.  Even our measure of benchmark 
competition, where we define a market as a county, suggests a highly concentrated market.  The 
average HHI across all U.S. counties is 4224—more than twice the Justice Department’s 
threshold for a “heavily concentrated” industry.  Still, nearly one-third of the population lives in 
counties with at least moderate benchmark competition (HHI ≤ 1800). 
 
Results – no interactions 
Table 3 shows both the coefficient estimates and the incident rate ratios (IRRs) resulting 
from estimating this equation without the interaction variables.  The table shows that controlling 
for size, water source, location, year, income, and urbanization, privately-owned firms have 
fewer contaminant violations, but more monitoring and reporting violations, than do 
municipally-owned firms.  The HHI is positively correlated with violations, suggesting that the 
number of violations increases with the share of the population served by a single firm.  In other 
words, this result is consistent with the hypothesis that competition—even in its weak form 




The table also shows that, in general, the number of violations of any type generally 
decreases as system size increases.  This correlation may reflect the fact that larger systems have 
more resources available to handle the costs of complying with SDWA regulations.  The table 
shows that increasing urbanization is associated with fewer violations of either type, but 
wealthier counties tend to have more violations.  This latter result is surprising, but the 
regressions also control for metropolitan area fixed effects and urbanization, which are both 
correlated with income.  Another possible explanation for this result is that EPA and states 
sponsor programs intended to aid “small and disadvantaged” communities with respect to 
SDWA regulations.
32  It is possible, therefore, that poorer counties have fewer violations either 
because programs to aid them are effective or because they are given more leeway in their 
reporting obligations. 
 
Results – interactions and simulations 
Because of the differences across size and ownership, the results presented here do not 
provide us with enough information to properly compare ownership types within size categories.  
To address this question, we next run the same negative binomial regression while interacting the 
ownership and size variables.  As above, we present both the estimated coefficients and the 
incident rate ratios.  Even with the IRRs, however, it is difficult to determine the economic 
magnitude of ownership effects implied by the regression output because negative binomial and 
Poisson regression coefficients are inherently difficult to interpret and because the interaction 
effects make even interpreting the IRRs challenging.  In addition to presenting the regression 
output we also use the coefficient estimates to simulate the expected number of violations by 
ownership type and size category.
33 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the equation with these interaction terms.  Figure 
5 shows the predicted simulated number of violations based on the regression results.  We 
simulate the expected number of events using the statistically significant coefficient estimates 
and setting the insignificant coefficients equal to zero, reflecting the regression’s inability to 
                                                 
32   See http://www.epa.gov/safewater/dwsrf.html.  Last accessed 03/15/05. 
33 These calculations are derived using the ‘prvalue’ ado program written by Long and Freese (2003) as part of their 




reject the hypothesis of that being the true coefficient estimate.
34  From the statistically 
significant coefficients we simulate the number of violations by ownership and size by setting 
the appropriate dummy variables equal to one (e.g., for small private systems, private=1, 
size_small = 1, private*small=1, all other size and ownership dummies = 0), the location fixed 
effects and the HHI equal to their population-weighted means, and water source and year fixed 
effects equal to their mean.  The results thus show the simulated number of violations for each 
ownership-size category in a “typical” location, concentration of water systems, and year from a 
“typical” water source.  The predicted number of violations would increase or decrease 
depending on actual location, water source, and year.  The differences between the ownership 
categories, however, would not change. 
 
Contaminant Violations 
  The first column of Table 4 shows the regression results while the first column of Figure 
5 shows the simulation results.  Again, the simulations make clear that health-based violations 
are relatively rare events for a typical water system, regardless of ownership type.  The 
difference between the two ownership types is generally quite small.  Nonetheless, controlling 
for water source, location, and year fixed effects, municipally-owned water systems have more 
contaminant violations per year than privately-owned systems in all size categories except 
among very large systems where the municipally-owned systems have fewer violations per year. 
 
Monitoring and Reporting Violations 
  As discussed above, states report each water system’s number of monitoring and 
reporting (MR) violations to the EPA.  These may provide some indication of effort to comply 
with SDWA regulations.  They may also provide some indication of the cost required to comply 
with the regulations to the extent that there are more MR violations across all ownership types 
and size categories than any other violation.  While the EPA does not consider monitoring and 
reporting violations, per se, to be health threats, an MR violation may in some cases mask a more 
                                                 
34 For the simulations we include coefficients significant at the 15% significance level or higher.  While this is a 
somewhat unconventional level of significance, it allows us to include more variables in the simulation.  As it turns 
out, using only the statistically significant coefficients for the simulations slightly affects the level of the predicted 




serious violation.  In other words, the results on contaminant violations should be interpreted in 
combination with MR violations to better compare ownership effects. 
  The second column of Table 4 reports the results of estimating the regression where the 
dependent variable is the number of MR violations in a system-year while the second column of 
Figure 5 shows the simulation results.  The first obvious result is that the predicted number of 
MR violations is much larger—10 times or so—than the predicted number of contaminant 
violations among all ownership types.  Privately-owned “very small” through “large” water 
systems have somewhat more MR violations than do systems of the same size owned by local 
governments.  Very large municipal systems, however, have more MR violations than do very 








Native American Water Systems: Poor SDWA Compliance 
 
  In the EPA data, nearly 650 active water systems are owned by Native American tribes, most of them 
very small (see Error! Reference source not found.).  While these systems have, on average, more 
contaminant violations than any other type of system (Figures 1 and 2), controlling for location and year fixed 
effects, water source, county income and urbanization, and water system concentration suggests that very small 
tribally owned systems may actually have slightly fewer contaminant violations than locally-owned systems.  
One reason the simulated number of contaminant violations for very small American Indian systems is lower 
than the averages presented earlier may reflect the fact that many tribes are in unforgiving locations where the 
water may be of inherently worse quality.  The simulation provides a predicted value for a hypothetical tribally-
owned system with the same other conditions (location, water source type, etc) as other systems.  In other words, 
were the typical very small tribal systems similar to other systems but for ownership, their number of 
contaminant violations would be more in line with other system types. 
 
  Unfortunately, even controlling for other factors, small and medium tribal systems have more 
contaminant violations than any other ownership type.  “Medium” tribal systems, moreover, have more than 
three times the number of contaminant violations as other ownership types.  Worse, the number of monitoring 
and reporting violations among tribal systems dwarfs the number of similar violations for any other ownership 
type in all size categories. 
 
In other words, the results suggest that tribally-owned water systems are the least likely to properly 
follow SDWA monitoring and reporting regulations.  And when they do properly monitor and report results they 







We are also interested in how the varying concentration of water systems (our measure of 
benchmark competition) affects these outcomes.  Tables 3 and 4 showed that violations tend to 
decrease as competition increases.  We use the coefficient estimates from Table 3 to simulate the 
changes in violations as benchmark competition changes because here we are not interested in 
the ownership-size interactions and the results are otherwise largely identical.  For these 
simulations, we hold the other variables at the weighted means defined above but also hold the 
ownership variables at their weighted means (so, for example, the private ownership variable is 
set equal to 0.1518, reflecting the fact that about 15 percent of the population gets water from 
private systems).  With these variables held constant, we allow the HHI to vary from 200 
(approximately the smallest value in the dataset) to 10,000 (indicating one system serving the 
entire county). 
Figure 6 shows the results of this simulation.  The predicted number of contaminant 
violations increases from 0.04 in the most “competitive” counties to 0.06 in the completely 
monopolistic counties.  The predicted number of MR violations increases from 0.38 in a very 
competitive county to 0.51 in a county with a monopoly supplier.  As in the ownership analysis, 
these are not tremendous differences, but do suggest that systems subject to benchmark 




Federal Water Systems: Less Likely to Follow SDWA than Cities or Private Firms 
  
Federal water systems, while classified by the EPA as “community water systems,” do not generally 
serve cities or towns.  The data include the name of each water system, and from the name we can infer what 
types of institutions and consumers those water systems serve.  Table  shows who federal systems serve by size 
for 2003.  The table shows, first, that the number of active federal systems (410) is tiny compared to the number 
of active municipal and private systems (close to 50,000).  It also shows that the majority of federal systems are 
military bases, followed by “other,” national parks and forests, prisons, and schools. 
  The figures calculated from the regression results suggest that federal systems tend to have slightly 
fewer contaminant violations than do private or municipal systems but more MR violations than do private and 
municipal systems in all size categories.  These results suggest that the federal government may be less likely to 
follow its own (EPA) regulations than are cities and private firms.  In addition, the fact that the two larger 
categories include primarily military bases suggests that the military does a worse job of complying with SDWA 





  In addition to water quality, we are also interested in whether water prices differ by 
ownership.  Unfortunately, to our knowledge no existing dataset contains water prices by utility, 
meaning there is no way of gathering water price data at the system level short of contacting 
each utility.  Even then, comparing prices might be difficult due to the common use of block 
rates and other differing pricing methods.  The Census, however, collects information on 
household water expenditures, which are available at the geographic level of the Public Use 
Microdata Area (PUMA).  A PUMA is a Census-defined area of at least 100,000 people.   
Census-provided equivalency files make it possible to map PUMAs into counties and therefore 
derive average household expenditures on water at the county level.
35 
  Unfortunately, the expenditure data are collected only during Census years, which means 
that we have expenditure data only for year 2000.
36  In addition, it is not possible to match 
households with the water utilities that serve them.  To test the effects of ownership we therefore 
convert the year 2000 cross-section into county-level observations.  Specifically, we calculate 
average household expenditures on water and the share of connections under each ownership 
type in every county.  An observation in the new dataset is therefore a county in the year 2000.  
It is then possible to estimate equation (5) to test the effects of ownership on water expenditures. 
 
(5)  yi = β0 + β1(share of systems under private ownershipi) + βxi + γs +  εi 
 
Where yi is the average household expenditure on water in county i in year 2000, γs are state 
fixed effects, and xi is a vector of county-level control variables including population, average 
income, the share of the population considered living in urban areas, the share of households 
whose rent includes their water service, and the HHI index discussed above to proxy for 
benchmark competition. 
Table 6 shows the results of estimating this equation.  The variable of primary interest, 
the share of water connections under private ownership, is negative and statistically significantly 
                                                 
35  The PUMA mapping is inexact in some cases.  Census data can be aggregated directly into counties using the 
Census “advanced query” (AQ).  Unfortunately, access to the AQ is not publicly available.  Still, it is not obvious 
that the AQ is superior to our method.  While the AQ precisely aggregates data into counties, it provides only dollar 
ranges for water expenditures, while the PUMS provides the exact dollar amount.  




correlated with water expenditures.  In other words, the greater the share of private water 
ownership in a county, the lower the average household expenditures on water.  The magnitude 
of the coefficient, however, does not imply a large difference between ownership types.  The 
results in the first column of the table imply that, all else equal, households in counties with 100 
percent private ownership would pay about $14 per year less than households in counties with 
100 percent public ownership, which is not especially large considering that average annual 
household water expenditures in 2000 were about $213. 
Income, population, and urban population share are positively correlated with household 
water expenditures.  The share of households whose rent includes water is negatively correlated 
with expenditures.  The coefficient on the rent variable is quite large in magnitude, which is not 
surprising as those households may simply report zero expenditures on water as they have little 
way of knowing their water usage. 
  The HHI, meant to proxy for benchmark competition, is negative and significant.  This 
result is surprising as it implies that benchmark competition increases household expenditures.  
The magnitude of the coefficient (8.23), though, is small.  It implies an annual difference in 
expenditures of about six dollars between the county in the dataset with the most benchmark 
competition (HHI = 0.256) and counties in which one firm serves the entire population (HHI = 
1). 
  It is possible, though, that public and private systems respond differently to benchmark 
competition.  To explore this issue, we create a dummy variable that equals one when there is at 
least moderate benchmark competition in the county.  We assume “moderate benchmark 
competition” exists when HHI < 1800.
37  The second column of Table 5 shows the results when 
including the interaction term and the competition dummy variable.  The coefficient on the HHI 
remains negative (suggesting expenditures in general increase with competition), but the 
interaction term is also negative with a relatively large coefficient.  This result suggests that more 
private ownership in the presence of competition is associated with lower expenditures.  The 
positive coefficient on the competition dummy variable suggests that this beneficial effect of 
competition does not apply to public systems. 
                                                 
37 This definition loosely follows the US Department of Justice guidelines, which define industries with an HHI < 




The expenditures results should be interpreted cautiously.  First, the data are county 
averages, not utility-level.  Second, nearly all drinking water prices are regulated, and the results 
could reflect differences in regulation across public and private firms. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Despite the bitter controversy over private versus public water systems, this analysis 
suggests, that overall, there is little difference between the public and private water systems in 
regulatory compliance controlling for location, year, and water source.  Privately-owned systems 
report somewhat fewer contaminant violations than do municipally-owned systems but 
somewhat more monitoring and reporting violations.  For systems that serve more than 100,000 
people, the results are reversed: private systems have more contaminant violations but fewer 
monitoring and reporting violations than do municipally-owned systems.  The evidence also 
suggests that benchmark competition makes some difference: water systems in counties in which 
each water system tends to serve a smaller share of the county population have fewer violations. 
The analysis of ownership and water expenditures suggests that average household water 
expenditures in a county decrease as the share of water connections served by private companies 
increases, controlling for population, income, urbanization, and the share of a county’s 
households whose water payments are included in their rent.  The changes, however, are small.  
The analysis also suggests that, all else equal, average annual household water expenditures 
would be only $14 less in a county with complete private ownership than in a county with 
complete municipal ownership. 
Our measure of benchmark competition yields intriguing results.  They suggest that the 
higher the share of a county’s population served by a single system, the less likely the system is 
to be in compliance with the SDWA.  The magnitude of the difference between the most 
competition and a county served by a single system, however, is small perhaps reflecting the 
relatively weak competitive pressures created by benchmark, as opposed to direct, competition.  
It is costly, after all, for consumers to move in order to be served by a different water system.  
Benchmark competition by itself is slightly positively correlated with expenditures, but when 
combined with private ownership appears to reduce annual household expenditures by perhaps 




of competition in an industry with very large fixed costs: firms may operate more efficiently 
when they can take advantage of economies of scale (thus leading to higher consumer 
expenditures when systems are smaller), but still respond to competitive pressures (thus leading 
to reduced consumer expenditures when private firms face benchmark competition).  Our results 
suggest that the competitive pressures outweigh efficiency gains when private, but not public, 
water systems face benchmark competition. 
Taken together, the results paint a less dramatic picture than either opponents or 
proponents of private ownership argue.  Neither ownership type yields results consistently 
superior to the other—private and municipal systems in the United States both generally comply 
equally well with drinking water regulations.  Water provided by privately owned systems is not 
less healthy or more expensive.  And while some have argued that for small water systems 
private firms may be better suited to handle the complicated and costly SDWA regulations 
(Koorse 2001), the data do not suggest that private small systems are notably better (or worse) 
than public small systems. 
Privately-owned water systems do not, of course, operate independently of government.  
States are heavily involved in regulating investor-owned water systems, overseeing rates, 
investment, and profits (Beecher 2000; Committee on Privatization of Water Services 2002).  It 
is possible that, for example, very large private systems have fewer monitoring and reporting 
violations in part because they are subject to a higher level of scrutiny.  For example, the 
California Public Utilities Commission regulates only investor-owned water and sewerage 
utilities, leaving municipalities to self-regulate their own systems.
38 
  The results may also show the difficulties of regulating governments.  Davies and Probst 
(2001) note that the government is responsible for both a large share of pollution and for 
regulating pollutants, potentially creating inconsistent incentives.  While the EPA does not own 
or run water systems, other government agencies are expected to follow the regulations 
promulgated by EPA under the SDWA.  It may be difficult for one government agency to 
impose penalties on another or force it to operate in a transparent manner.  Water systems owned 
by the federal government have relatively more monitoring and reporting violations than do 
private or municipal systems, especially those operated by the military.  We cannot know 
precisely why the federal government, and the military in particular, are less likely to comply 
                                                 




with regulations.  It is possible, though, that the EPA is less likely to attempt to impose penalties 
on a military base than it is to take enforcement action against a city or firm. 
  Tribal systems also yield intriguing results.  Of all ownership types, water systems owned 
by American Indian tribes are the most likely to have monitoring and reporting violations and, 
when they do report accurately, the most likely to have contaminants in their water.  The 
regressions control for location fixed effects and, therefore, for the fact that many of these 
systems are in areas where the water may be of inherently worse quality.  But as the US 
Congressional Budget Office (1995) noted, complying with these regulations can be costly, and 
these results may highlight the difficulty poor communities have in complying with the 
regulations.  It is also possible that tribal systems have weak compliance with SDWA regulations 
because, for example, the EPA or the states are unlikely to pursue enforcement actions against 
them. 
 
Caveats and Conclusions 
While the results are intriguing, the data have limitations that prevent us from answering 
related, relevant questions and answering definitively whether one type of ownership is superior.  
First, ownership is not the only way in which the private sector can be involved in piped water 
provision.  Other types of private sector participation include franchising, lease contracts and 
concessions, build-operate-transfer contracts, and maintenance contracts (e.g., Seidenstat 2003).  
These different types of public-private interactions may create different incentives that could 
affect outcomes, either in terms of SDWA compliance or pricing.  Second, our data do not 
permit an analysis of a firm’s efficiency.  We have no information on operation costs or 
employment, and we observe prices only indirectly through average household expenditures at 
the county level.  Without such information it is not possible to estimate welfare effects.  Third, 
we do not have information on the severity of any contaminant violations and therefore the 
expected health harms that might result from them.  Fourth, and related, we do not attempt to 
incorporate what real health consequences might arise from violations.  Even a single violation 
of some contaminants could cause substantial health problems, while multiple violations of other 
contaminants grouped into the “health-based” contaminant group may have no impact on public 




  That there appears to be little difference between public and private water systems is 
sensible.  Competition drives innovation and efficiency improvements, but in the water sector is 
not nearly as robust as in other industries.  Municipalities that contract out part or all of their 
water systems to private operators may create competition for the contract, and the large number 
of water utilities in the country suggests that there may be some benchmark competition.  Even 
this limited form of competition appears to yield some benefits.  The number of violations 
decreases as our measure of benchmark competition increases, while average household 
expenditures decrease as private ownership and benchmark competition increases.  Nevertheless, 
a given household generally cannot choose its water and sewerage provider: at a given point in 
time consumers have no say over who provides their service.  Absent true competition or 
evidence that regulatory enforcement measures are targeted at one ownership type more than 





Number of Active Systems in 2003 
System Size 
Ownership 
Very small  Small  Medium  Large  Very large 
Private 21,774  3,751  630  458  50 
Local Govt.  6,469  9,359  3,716  2,879  309 
State Govt.  205  241  75  30  1 
Federal Govt.  137  108  87  67  0 
Native Am.  452  165  26  3  0 
Public/Private 711  619  135  66 6 
Unknown 547  132  24 13  0 
Total 30,295  14,375  4,693  3,516  366 
Note: Size categories established by US EPA based on average daily population served: 
Very small:  25 – 500  Small: 501-3,300  Medium: 3,301 – 10,000 







Total Population Served in 2003 
System Size 
Ownership 
Very small Small  Medium  Large  Very large 
Private  3,082,896 4,564,502 3,608,747 13,691,534 19,550,550 
Local Govt  1,547,284  13,854,549 21,707,493 81,009,849 102,691,886 
State  Govt. 44,854  373,175 420,248 805,723 103,414 
Federal  Govt.  26,502  188,273 519,075 1,507,352  0 
Native  Am. 82,764  223,255 141,477 48,860  0 
Public/Private  146,950 880,510 684,030 1,517,788  1,275,450 
Unknown  79,223  184,846 148,678 307,092 0 
Total 5,010,473  20,269,110 27,229,748 98,888,198 123,621,300 
Note: Size categories established by US EPA based on average daily population served: 
Very small:  25 – 500  Small: 501-3,300  Medium: 3,301 – 10,000 







Regression Results: Ownership and SDWA Violations 







 coef  irr  coef  irr 
Private -0.283  0.754  0.292  1.339 
   (-13.26)**  (18.21)** 
Native American  0.013  1.013  1.733  5.657 
   -0.16  (29.20)** 
Federal -0.384  0.681  0.63  1.877 
   (-3.56)**  (9.47)** 
State -0.227  0.797  0.229  1.257 
   (-2.75)**  (3.99)** 
Income 0.002  1.002  0.009  1.009 
   (1.79)+  (10.24)** 
Share county urban  -0.296  0.743  -0.202  0.817 
   (-7.46)**  (-6.83)** 
HHI (scaled 0-1)  0.329  1.39  0.302  1.353 
   (6.83)**  (8.13)** 
Small -0.278  0.758  -0.538  0.584 
   (-12.37)**  (-32.69)** 
Medium 0.021  1.022  -0.576  0.562 
   -0.63  (-22.64)** 
Large 0.296  1.344  -0.439  0.644 
   (7.38)**  (-14.86)** 
Very Large  -0.396  0.673  -0.68  0.506 
   (-2.71)**  (-8.00)** 
Water source=GUP  -0.824  0.439  -0.876  0.417 
   (-2.24)*  (-4.48)** 
Water source==GW  0.427  1.532  -1.114  0.328 
   (4.50)**  (-18.53)** 
Water source==GWP  -0.107  0.899  -2.1  0.122 
   (-1.02)  (-30.53)** 
Water source==SW  -0.425  0.654  -0.734  0.48 
   (-4.23)**  (-11.67)** 
Water source==SWP  -0.609  0.544  -2.033  0.131 
   (-6.11)**  (-32.22)** 
Constant -2.641 -0.701 
   (-2.96)**  (-1.03) 
Observations 323907  323907 
Log Likelihood  -84466.765  -286183.38 
LR chi2(230)  6394.58  23801.17 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
        
Year and MSA fixed effects included. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 







Regression Results: Ownership and SDWA Violations 
With Interaction Effects 




 coef  irr  coef  irr 
   (z-stat)  (z-stat) 
Private -0.329  0.72  0.356  1.427 
   (-12.86)**  (17.93)** 
Native American  -0.279  0.756  1.795  6.019 
   (-2.72)**  (24.97)** 
Federal -0.539  0.583  0.697  2.008 
   (-3.03)**  (6.16)** 
State -0.659  0.518  -0.021  0.979 
   (-4.54)**  (-0.23) 
Income 0.002  1.002  0.009  1.009 
   (1.78)+  (10.19)** 
Percentage Urban  -0.294  0.745  -0.207  0.813 
   (-7.40)**  (-7.01)** 
HHI/10,000 0.325 1.383  0.292  1.339 
   (6.74)**  (7.84)** 
Small -0.337  0.714  -0.475  0.622 
   (-11.91)**  (-21.93)** 
Medium -0.061  0.941  -0.5  0.606 
   (-1.57)  (-17.02)** 
Large 0.267  1.306  -0.388  0.678 
   (6.04)**  (-11.54)** 
Very Large  -0.554  0.574  -0.515  0.598 
   (-3.41)**  (-5.59)** 
psource==GUP -0.822  0.44  -0.886  0.412 
   (-2.24)*  (-4.54)** 
psource==GW 0.424  1.528  -1.127  0.324 
   (4.47)**  (-18.74)** 
psource==GWP -0.121  0.886  -2.097  0.123 
   (-1.15)  (-30.49)** 
psource==SW -0.421  0.656  -0.744 0.475 
   (-4.19)**  (-11.83)** 
psource==SWP -0.615  0.541  -2.039  0.13 
   (-6.16)**  (-32.30)** 
Private*small 0.102  1.108  -0.164 0.849 
   (2.13)*  (-4.82)** 
Private*medium 0.245  1.278  -0.199  0.82 
   (2.68)**  (-2.97)** 
Private*large -0.082 0.921  -0.126  0.882 
   (-0.76)  (-1.69)+ 
Private*very large  0.727  2.069  -1.044  0.352 




Indian*small 0.578  1.783  -0.061  0.941 
   (3.15)**  (-0.45) 
Indian*medium 1.364  3.911  -0.593  0.553 
   (4.39)**  (-2.05)* 
Indian*large 1.022 2.777  -0.1  0.904 
   (0.67)  (-0.08) 
State*small 0.77 2.161  0.549  1.732 
   (4.16)**  (4.40)** 
State*medium 0.414  1.513  -0.164  0.849 
   (1.43)  (-0.85) 
State*large 0.032  1.032  -0.359  0.698 
   (0.08)  (-1.19) 
Federal*small -0.214  0.807  -0.119 0.888 
   (-0.69)  (-0.7) 
Federal*medium 0.5  1.648  -0.303  0.738 
   (1.80)+  (-1.65)+ 
Federal*large 0.392  1.48  0.154  1.167 
   (1.29)  (0.79) 
Constant -2.58  -0.794 
 (-2.88)** (-1.16) 
Observations 323907  323907 
Log Liklihood  -84435.656  -286139.4 
LR chi2(243)  6456.80  23889.14 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
  
Year and MSA fixed effects included in all regressions 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 





Groups Served by Federal Water Systems 
Type of Organization Served 
Size 
Military  National Park/ 
Forest  Prison School Other 
Very Small  30  41  4  8  55 
Small 51  14  16  1  31 
Medium 86  2  0 0  7 
Large 58  2  0  0  4 
Very Large  0  0  0  0  0 
TOTAL 225 59  20  9  97 
Note: Size categories established by US EPA based on average daily population served: 
Very small:  25 – 500  Small: 501-3,300  Medium: 3,301 – 10,000 
Large: 10,001 – 100,000  Very Large: 100,001 + 
The figures in the table are derived from water system names.  As a result, the figures  





Ownership and Household Water Expenditures 
 
Dependent Variable: Mean annual household water expenditures 
 




Share of water systems privately owned  -14.02  -8.77 
 (3.14)  (1.82) 
HHI (scaled 0 – 1)  -8.23  -7.87 
 (2.24)  (1.96) 
Share private * Benchmark competition    -33.15 
   (2.97) 
Benchmark competition (HHI < 1800)    6.11 
   (1.86) 
County average income (in dollars)  3.06  3.06 
 (28.11)  (28.00) 
Share of households with water included in rent  -98.23  -100.69 
 (3.16)  (3.24) 
Share of county that is urban  34.99  34.79 
 (10.33)  (10.28) 
County population in year 2000 (in thousands)  0.013  0.013 
 (3.90)  (3.89) 
Constant 97.08  96.76 
   (24.24)  (23.73) 
Observations 3058  3058 
R-squared 0.36  0.36 
State fixed effects included, not shown. 
Observation = county. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 1 
The EPA SDWIS/FED single-year violations data (1994 through 2003) 
 
This dataset contains information at the level of the community water system (CWS).  
According to the EPA, a community water system is a public water system that serves at least 15 
service connections used by year-round residents or regularly serves at least 25 year-round 
residents.
1 There are roughly 50,000 active CWS in the 50 U.S. States, tribal areas, and in U.S. 
territories. This dataset includes both active and closed water systems. Each observation in our 
panel dataset is a water system-year, yielding 962,897 total observations. 
 
The SDWIS/FED contains the following descriptive data for each CWS: 
 
•  Water system identification number. 
•  Water system name. 
•  EPA region in which the system is located (1-10). 
•  Type of geographic region: Tribal (native American Indian tribe), State, or Territory 
(Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Palau, American Samoa, or Northern 
Mariana Islands). 
•  Two-letter state or territory abbreviation (and either NN – for Navajo Nation – or a 
two digit numeric EPA region code for tribal areas). 
•  Primary county served. 
•  Status – active or closed. 
•  Number of service connections. 
•  Estimated average daily population served. 
•  Five size categories, based on average daily population served: 




Very_Large:  100,000+       
•  Eleven size categories, based on average daily population served:  
a_<=100                        b_101-500 
c_501-1,000                  d_1,001-3,300 
e_3,301-10,000             f_10,001-50,000  
g_50,001-100,000         h_100,001-250,000 
i_250,001-500,000        j_500,001-1,000,000 
k_>1,000,000 
•  Ownership category 
o  Federal Government 
o  State Government 
o  Local Government 
o  Public/Private 
                                                 
1 Closed systems are those that states have reported to the EPA as being inactive, or that were not reported at all in a 
states' last data submission. Inactive systems are almost always permanently closed.  Active systems are normal, 
functioning water systems. Conversation with Lee Kyle, EPA Office of Water. October 1, 2004. A -  2
o  Private 
o  Native American 
o  Unknown 
 
 
The SDWIS/FED also contains data on the number of SDWA violations for each system 
each year.  The dataset breaks down violations by violation type (violations of maximum 
contaminant levels, violations of maximum residual disinfectant levels, treatment technique 
violations, and monitoring and reporting violations), and then breaks down health-based 
violations by the specific contaminant responsible for the violation. The following table lists the 
way the EPA defines the violations. 
 













The Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) is the maximum 
allowed level of a contaminant in drinking water.  MCLs 
are enforceable standards.  MCLs exist for each of many 
contaminants that can adversely affect public health and are 
known or anticipated to occur in water. MCLs are set as 
close to MCLGs (maximum contaminant level goals) as 
feasible, using the best available treatment technology and 











The Maximum Residual Disinfectant Level (MRDL) is the 
highest level of a disinfectant allowed in drinking water. 
Disinfectants are added to water because there is 
convincing evidence that their addition is necessary for 









A Treatment Technique (TT) is a required process intended 
to reduce the level of a contaminant in drinking water. A 
Treatment Technique Violation is a failure to properly treat 











A Monitoring/ Reporting violation occurs when a system 
fails to collect the required number of samples (including 
confirmation samples), fails to collect them during the 
specified time frame, fails to ensure the samples are 












A Public Notice Violation occurs when a system fails to 
send adequate public notice, or fails to send it within the 
required time frame. The “Other” category could obviously 






 A -  3
The combined sum of MCL, MRDL, and TT violations—known as “health-based 
violations”— are comprised of several violations, which are listed below.  Definitions are from 








Contaminants Under this Heading/ 
Explanation  Associated Health Risk 
Total Coliform 
Rule and Turbidity 
(all are MCL 
violations) 
a_tcr  Fecal coliform and E. coli bacteria. Their 
presence indicates that the water may be 
contaminated with human or animal wastes.   
 
Turbidity is a measure of the cloudiness of 
water, and results from soil runoff. It indicates 
water quality and filtration effectiveness.  
•  Disease-causing microbes 
(pathogens) in fecal coliform 
and E. coli can cause 
diarrhea, cramps, nausea, 
headaches, or other 
symptoms. 
•  These microorganisms can 
cause nausea, cramps, 





(all are TT 
violations) 
b1_swtr  Total Trihalomethanes (TTHMs) are a 
byproduct of drinking water disinfection. 
Liver, kidney or central 
nervous system problems; 




and the LT1 
(future) Enhanced 




The Interim Enhanced Surface Water 
Treatment Rule amends the existing Surface 
Water Treatment Rule to strengthen microbial 
protection, including provisions specifically to 
address Cryptosporidium, and to address risk 
trade-offs with disinfection byproducts. The 
final rule includes treatment requirements for 
waterborne pathogens, e.g., Cryptosporidium. 
In addition, systems must continue to meet 
existing requirements for Giardia lamblia and 
viruses. 
Intestinal illness and death 
Stage 1 
Disinfectants By-
Product Rule (all 
are MCL and TT 
violations) 
e_st1_dbp  Total Trihalomethanes (TTHM) (including 
chloroform, bromodichloromethane, 
dibromochloromethane, and bromoform), five 
Haloacetic Acids, Bromate, Chlorite, 
Chrlorine, Chloramines, Chlorine dioxide 
TTHM Rule 
violations (which 
was later replaced 
by the ST1 DBP 




Total Trihalomethanes (TTHM) 
Some disinfectants and 
disinfection byproducts have 
been shown to cause cancer 
and reproductive effects in 
lab animals and suggested 
bladder cancer and 




(all are MCL 
violations) 
h_voc 1,1,1-Trichloroethane,  1,1,2-Trichloroethane, 
1,1-Dichloroethylene, 1,2-Dichloroethane, 




•  1,1,1-Trichloroethane: 
Liver, nervous system, or 
circulatory problems 
•  1,1,2-Trichloroethane: 
Liver, kidney, or immune 
system problems 
                                                 
2 For more information, see: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.html#1 and  
http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/mdbp/ieswtr.html and http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mdbp/qrg_st1.pdf (Last 
accessed: October 22, 2004). A -  4
Trichloroethylene, and Vinyl chloride.  
Discharge from chemical plans and industrial 
activities, leaching from PVC pipes, and 
leaching from gas storage tanks and landfills 
are just a few ways in which these volatile 
organic chemicals can contaminate the 
drinking water supply. 
•  1,1-Dichloroethylene and 
cis-1,2-Dichloroethylene: 
Liver problems 
•  1,2-Dichloroethane, 1,2-
Dichloropropane, and Vinyl 
chloride: Increased risk of 
cancer 
•  Benzene: Anemia; 
decrease in blood platelets; 
increased risk of cancer 




problems; increased risk of 
cancer 
•  Styrene: Liver, kidney, or 
circulatory system problems 
•  Toluene: Nervous system, 
kidney, or liver problems 
Synthetic Organic 
Chemicals (all are 
MCL violations) 
i_soc 1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane,  Alachlor, 
Atrazine, Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate, Di(2-
ethylhexyl) phthalate, Endothall, Ethylene 
dibromide (EDB), Lindane, 
Pentachlorophenol, Simazine, Total 
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB), and 
Toxaphene. Runoff/ leaching from insecticide 
used on cattle, lumber, and gardens, runoff 
from herbicide used on row crops, and 
discharge from rubber and chemical factories 
are just a few ways in which these synthetic 
organic chemicals can contaminate the 




increased risk of cancer 
•  Alachlor: Eye, liver, 
kidney or spleen problems; 
anemia; increased risk of 
cancer 
•  Atrazine: Cardiovascular 
system or reproductive 
problems 
•  Bis(2-ethylhexyl) 
phthalate: 
•  Di(2-ethylhexyl) 
phthalate: Reproductive 
difficulties; liver problems; 
increased risk of cancer 
•  Endothall: Stomach and 
intestinal problems 
•  Ethylene dibromide 
(EDB): Problems with liver, 
stomach, reproductive 
system, or kidneys; increased 
risk of cancer 
•  Lindane: Liver/ kidney 
problems 
•  Pentachlorophenol: Liver/ 
kidney problems; increased 
cancer risk 
•  Simazine: Problems with 
blood 
•  Polychlorinated 
Biphenyls: Skin changes; 
thymus gland problems; 
immune deficiencies; A -  5
reproductive or nervous 
system difficulties; increased 
risk of cancer 
•  Toxaphene: 
Kidney/liver/thyroid 
problems; increased risk of 
cancer 
Nitrates  (all are 
MCL violations) 
j1_nitrates Nitrate,  Nitrite,  and Nitrate-Nitrite. Enters the 
drinking water supply via runoff from 
fertilizer use, leaching from septic tanks, 
sewage, or erosion of natural deposits. 
Infants below the age of six 
months who drink water 
containing nitrates in excess 
of their MCL could become 
seriously ill and, if untreated, 
may die. Symptoms include 
shortness of breath and blue-
baby syndrome. 
Arsenic (all are 
MCL violations) 
j2_arsenic  Arsenic enters the drinking water supply due 
to erosion of natural deposits, runoff from 
orchards, and runoff from glass and 
electronics production wastes 
Skin damage or problems 
with circulatory systems, and 
may have increased risk of 
getting cancer 
Other Inorganic 




Antimony, Asbestos, Barium, Beryllium, 
Cadmium, Chromium, Cyanide, Fluoride, 
Mercury (inorganic), Selenium, and Thallium.   
•  Antimony: Increase in 
blood cholesterol; decrease in 
blood sugar 
•  Asbestos: Increased risk of 
developing benign intestinal 
polyps 
•  Barium: Increased blood 
pressure 
•  Beryllium: Intestinal 
lesions 
•  Cadmium: Kidney damage 
•  Chromium: Allergic 
dermatitis 
•  Cyanide: Nerve damage or 
thyroid problems 
•  Fluoride: Bone disease 
(pain and tenderness of the 
bones); Children may get 
mottled teeth 
•  Mercury: Kidney damage 
•  Selenium: Hair or 
fingernail loss; numbness in 
fingers or toes; circulatory 
problems 
•  Thallium: Hair loss; blood 







k_rads  Alpha particles, Beta particles and photon 
emitters, Radium 226 and Radium 228 
(combined), and Uranium. These come from 
the erosion and decay of natural deposits of 
certain radioactive minerals. 
Increased risk of cancer (and 
uranium can lead to kidney 
toxicity) 
Lead and Copper 
Rule (all are TT 
violations) 
l_lcr  Lead and copper, which penetrate the water 
supply due to the corrosion of household 
plumbing systems and erosion of natural 
deposits. 
•  Infants and children: 
Delays in physical or mental 
development; slight deficits 
in attention span and learning A -  6
abilities 
•  Adults: Kidney problems 





Acanthamoeba, Adenoviruses, Aeromonas 
hydrophila,  Caliciviruses,  Coxsackieviruses,  
Cyanobacteria, Echoviruses,  Helicobacter 
pylori,  Microsporidia, (Enterocytozoon & 
Septata) Mycobacterium avium intracellulare 
(MAC), 1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane, 1,2,4-
trimethylbenzene,  1,1-dichloroethane, 1,1-
dichloropropene, 1,2-diphenylhydrazine,  1,3-
dichloropropane,  1,3-Dichloropropene, 2,4,6-
trichlorophenol,  2,2-dichloropropane, 2,4-
dichlorophenol, 2,4-dinitrophenol, 2,4-
dinitrotoluene, 2,6-dinitrotoluene,  2-methyl-
Phenol (o-cresol), Acetochlor, Alachlor ESA 
and other acetanilide pesticide degradation 
products, Aldrin, Aluminum, Boron, 
Bromobenzene,  DCPA mono-acid degradate,  
DCPA di-acid degradate,  DDE, Diazinon, 
Dieldrin, Disulfoton, Diuron, EPTC (s-ethyl-
dipropylthiocarbamate), Fonofos, 
Hexachlorobutadiene, p-Isopropyltoluene (p-
cymene), Linuron, Manganese, Methyl 
bromide, Methyl-t-butyl ether (MTBE),  
Metolachlor, Metribuzin, Molinate, 
Naphthalene, Nitrobenzene, Organotins, 
Perchlorate, Prometon, RDX, Sodium, 
Sulfate, Terbacil, Terbufos, Triazines & 
degradation products of triazines, and 
Vanadium 
 
Unregulated contaminants for which the EPA 
has set a “secondary standard”: 
Aluminum, Chloride, Color, Corrosivity, 
Fluoride, Foaming Agents, Iron, Manganese, 
Odor, pH, Silver, Sulfate, Total Dissolved 
Solids, and Zinc 
These contaminants are not 
considered to present a risk to 
human health.  
 
Those contaminants for 
which the EPA has set a 
“secondary standard” do not 
present a risk to human health 




                                                 
3 “Not Regulated” includes contaminants regulated by states and not by the EPA, which sets non-enforceable 
“secondary standards” (see below), and contaminants that are completely unregulated but are monitored. Source: 
Lee Kyle, EPA Office of Water, 10/25/04. 
All “Not Regulated” violations should be MCL violations. Some, however, have been incorrectly classified as 
treatment technique or monitoring/ reporting violations (Source: Lee Kyle, EPA Office of Water, 11/23/04). 
4 National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations (NSDWRs, or secondary standards) are non-enforceable 
guidelines regulating contaminants that may cause cosmetic effects (such as skin or tooth discoloration) or aesthetic 
effects (such as taste, odor, or color) in drinking water. EPA recommends secondary standards to water systems but 
does not require systems to comply. However, states may choose to adopt them as enforceable standards.  For more 
information, see: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/consumer/2ndstandards.html (Last accessed: 10/27/04). 
 